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Abstract 
The rising support for radical parties in Europe has triggered a new interest in the political sociology 
of voting and how voters with socio-economic insecurity are moving away from establishment 
politics. In this article, we apply Standing’s concept of ‘precarity’ to capture insecurity among 
ordinary voters and thereby expand the individual socio-economic explanations behind the vote for 
radical populist right (RPR) and radical left (RL) parties. We develop a multidimensional measure 
of precarity to capture subjective labour market insecurity in its different manifestations. The 
article examines the influence of precarity on voting in two countries – France and the Netherlands 
– that, in the 2017 elections, saw the culmination of a decline in support for establishment parties 
and a rise in support for both RPR and RL parties. We use panels of voters collected during 
these elections through online Voting Advice Applications, weighted against national census 
benchmarks. We identify and assess the role of two dimensions of precarity: ‘precarity of tenure’ 
and ‘precarity at work’. We find that in both France and the Netherlands precarity is, overall, 
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negatively correlated with voting for established parties and positively correlated with voting 
for RPR and RL parties. Furthermore, our investigation shows that ‘precarity at work’ is more 
significant in explaining voting support than the more widely investigated ‘precarity of tenure’. 
Our results stress the importance of assessing how subjective work insecurity explains voting and 
support for RPR and RL parties.
Keywords
left behind, precarity, populism, populist right, radical left
Introduction
The unexpected rise of what has been loosely defined as populist voting and support for 
radical parties has attracted much recent speculation in sociological research and has 
raised the question of what role socio-economic factors, and precarity in particular, play 
in driving this political backlash. While ‘precarity’ is often mentioned as a plausible 
explanation for populist voting (see Gidron and Hall, 2017; Tammes, 2017), measures of 
subjective labour market insecurity are surprisingly overlooked in investigations of vot-
ing behaviours (Marx and Picot, 2020) and, even more importantly, a transposition of the 
sociological notion of precarity in voting is missing.
Our study responds to this existing gap by transposing the sociological concept of 
precarity (as in Standing, 2011) to the political realm of voting behaviours. The explora-
tion of the political effects of socially constructed precarity constitutes one of the most 
pressing issues in contemporary sociological research. To this end, our contribution 
offers, for the first time, a multidimensional construction of precarity which includes 
several aspects of work-related precarity (e.g. work security, autonomy at work, cogni-
tive employment insecurity, work–life balance) to explain voting.
The article focuses on two highly relevant case studies, namely parliamentary elec-
tions in France and the Netherlands in 2017, which represent the culmination of medium-
term trends: high levels of electoral volatility away from established parties, in particular 
a steep decline in support for the centre-left, and, at the same time, the rise of both radical 
left (RL) and radical right electoral support. Using panels of voters collected during pre-
vious elections through online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) and weighted to rep-
resent the total population, we are able to assess precarity among working voters, thus 
expanding the current way of assessing socio-economic insecurity in relation to voting 
patterns. We examine two dimensions of precarity: precarity of tenure (which refers to 
subjective insecurity in contract length) and precarity at work (which refers to subjective 
insecurity in work conditions).
Our findings show a positive association between electoral support for RPR parties 
(Front National in France and Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands) and RL parties 
(such as La France Insoumise in France and Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands) and 
precarity in the two countries. The findings also show that voting for traditional parties 
(Christian democrats/social democratic parties) is negatively associated with precarity in 
both France and the Netherlands. In addition, we identify the forms of precarity relevant 
in each case study (with precarity of tenure and precarity at work being significant in 
explaining voting in France, and precarity at work being more relevant in the Netherlands) 
and explain these variations using the existing literature.
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In finding associations between precarity and voting, the study substantially expands 
on the investigation of the subjective socio-economic factors in relation to voting, with 
explanations for populist voting tending to be cultural (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). The 
study builds on the attempt to produce explanations of populist voting that capture socio-
economic concerns among ordinary voters (Antonucci et al., 2017), instead of concen-
trating on measurements of disadvantage that focus only on marginalised segments (‘the 
left behind’). Our investigation of how diffused insecurity enters into voting is, however, 
limited to subjective measures and only looks at working voters.
The article is structured as follows. First, it discusses how precarity can expand the 
current theoretical understanding of voting shifts in sociology. Second, it proposes a 
framework to understand the link between precarity and voting. Third, it discusses how 
labour market insecurity is linked to the recent successes of RPR and RL parties in our 
case studies. Fourth, it presents our methodology and model of how precarity is linked to 
voting and our hypotheses. The main findings of the study are then presented, and the 
results are discussed by country, by type of party and by dimension of precarity. The 
conclusion situates our findings within the broader literature on the political sociology of 
radical voting.
The reasons for exploring precarity in relation to voting
‘Precarity’ is a term that has become increasingly significant in scholarly and popular 
debates since the 2010s crisis and whose conceptual and empirical implications remain 
highly debated (Parfitt and Barnes, 2020). Standing’s (2011) exploration of precarity has 
been a ‘key driver of the proliferation of precarity scholarship’ (Parfitt and Barnes, 2020: 
488). We employ this concept for two main reasons. First, Standing’s (2011) ‘precarity-
in-work’ expands the focus on precarious job contracts to include other elements of job 
insecurity, such as insecurity linked to career mobility and income insecurity. These are 
elements that have entered the job-quality literature at various junctures (see in particular 
Gallie, 2017). Compared to job quality, precarity looks at the effects of work beyond 
work, as it indicates ‘a generalised set of social conditions and an associated sense of 
insecurity’ (Arnold and Bongiovi, 2013: 299). Indeed, the concept of precarity consti-
tutes an umbrella term to consider the overall effects of work insecurity and investigate 
its societal repercussions, such as for voting.
Second, the concept of ‘precarity’ is specifically concerned with the political reper-
cussions of insecurity. Standing’s (2011: 147–153) forecast that precarity would have led 
to a politics of inferno is based on links between subjective labour market insecurity and 
populist voting that have been highlighted in political sciences (see Mughan et al., 2003). 
The most recent analysis of the insecurity behind populist voting by Gidron and Hall 
(2017) has a similar frame, supposing a link between subjective labour market insecurity 
and voting.
Our interest in exploring subjective labour market insecurity derives from our identi-
fication of two main limitations in the current conceptual tools to explain the recent surge 
in radical party support. First, we contend that considering the link between precarity and 
voting behaviour permits a deeper understanding of subjective socio-economic insecu-
rity experienced by broader social groups than the ‘left behind’ (albeit one that is limited 
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to those who work). Indeed, since the Brexit vote, a number of scholars have explained 
the rise in populist voting as a revolt of the left behind (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). 
Goodwin and Heath (2016: 330) define the left behind as ‘social groups that are united 
by a general sense of insecurity, pessimism and marginalization’. The terminology of the 
‘left behind’ refers to small and marginalised segments of the population (Antonucci 
et al., 2017) and it is operationalised accordingly. Norris and Inglehart (2019) and 
Rooduijn (2018), for example, have both rejected the socio-economic explanation of the 
rise of right-wing populism by using the ‘left behind’ operationalisation and focusing 
exclusively on working-class individuals (following the classic occupational class 
scheme division), unemployed people and benefits recipients. Other scholars, however, 
have noted that populist voting is associated not with vulnerability per se, but with a 
sense of subjective insecurity and a loss of subjective economic position experienced not 
just by individuals living with extreme forms of disadvantage, but by broader segments 
of the population (Antonucci et al., 2017; Duvoux and Papuchon, 2018; Gidron and Hall, 
2017; Kurer and Palier, 2019).
Second, our focus on precarity centres on the exploration of subjective labour market 
insecurity experienced by all working voters and therefore enables the insider/outsider 
division to be overcome. The ‘dualisation of the labour market’ framework postulates 
diverging voting behaviours between a minority of the labour market ‘outsiders’ (i.e. 
unemployed people, individuals with temporary/part-time contracts) and the vast major-
ity of labour market ‘insiders’, that is, individuals in full-time permanent work 
(Emmenegger et al., 2015; Schwander, 2018).1 While these studies focus on the ‘disad-
vantaged outsiders’ measured in objective terms, precarity involves subjective, and 
potentially majoritarian, forms of labour market insecurity. Subjective measures of pre-
carity represent overlooked and robust operationalisations of labour market insecurity 
(Marx and Picot, 2020). Furthermore, the literature on job quality after the 2008 crisis 
shows limited evidence of an increase in diffused insecurity as an effect of precarious 
contracts, but clear signs of rising work intensity and declining quality of work affecting 
what would be considered ‘labour market insiders’ and that could be experienced subjec-
tively. These trends are mediated by institutional arrangements and are not driven by 
technological changes per se (Gallie, 2017). This clashes with the focus on the effects of 
technology on the one side (Im et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020), and contractual-based insecu-
rity of ‘outsiders’ on the other (Emmenegger et al., 2015), which dominate the current 
explorations of labour market insecurity in relation to voting.
A framework to understand the link between ‘precarity’ 
and the rise of radical electoral support
The mechanism transforming a higher level of subjective work insecurity into voting 
for RPR2 and RL parties is both instrumental/direct and symbolic/indirect (Gidron and 
Hall, 2017). The direct/instrumental route presupposes that voting for certain party 
agendas potentially improves the labour market conditions of voters. The indirect 
route refers to how new radical party options offer a symbolic anti-establishment 
option for those who feel they have a declined status due to their subjective work posi-
tion (ibid.).
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In our framework, we can identify a direct and instrumental ‘pull-out’ factor away 
from Christian democratic and social democratic parties in Western Europe. The attack 
from radical parties now resonates more because social democrats, in order to achieve or 
maintain coalition potential, embraced much of the pro-capitalist, neoliberal agenda of 
the 1980s – which diluted their defence of welfare state provisions, trade unionism, 
social equality and justice, and redistribution of wealth and knowledge – and abandoned 
the protection of workers’ rights through policies that favoured flexible labour markets 
since the 1990s (see Bale et al., 2010; Mughan, 2003). To demonstrate this point, social 
democratic parties increasingly rely on electoral support from better-off middle-class 
voters (Gingrich and Häuserman, 2015). Similarly, the Christian democratic groups, par-
ticularly those in the continental countries analysed in this study, have a long-standing 
history of social capitalism that has progressively incorporated some market-liberal pro-
posals since the 1990s, while keeping its social capitalist framework (van Kersbergen, 
1995). The post-2008 crisis years, however, have fundamentally challenged the social 
capitalism basis of both centrist groups (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2010; Karreth 
et al., 2014; Kriesi, 2012), leading to the convergence of centrist agendas anticipated by 
Kirchheimer (1966). Social democratic and Christian democratic parties, while govern-
ing in a majority of EU member states during the 2008 crisis, enacted a substantial num-
ber of reforms aimed at liberalising the labour market and reducing workers’ protection 
(Adascalitei and Pignatti-Morano, 2015).
There is also a more symbolic and indirect process of ‘pulling out’ from social demo-
cratic and centre-right parties. The liberalisation of the labour market has resulted in a 
‘greater exposure of employees to market forces, the impact of the intensification of the 
labour process and a loss of status and control at work’ (Doogan, 2001: 436). The politi-
cal and ideological construction of insecurity stemming from the changed circumstances 
at work (Doogan, 2001: 435) tends to lead voters towards anti-establishment electoral 
options (see Gidron and Hall, 2017) – although we suspect this to be mediated by labour 
market arrangements.
At the same time, a ‘pull-in’ process has occurred for support for RPR and RL parties. 
Labour market insecurity tends to play a prominent role in the political agendas of radi-
cal right parties rising in the polls. While RPR parties agree that the post-war welfare 
state should be dismantled to enhance individual autonomy and self-reliance, they also 
defend native workers against the threats of global cheap labour (Mughan et al., 2003). 
There has been an ‘interventionist-nationalist’ shift among RPR parties (a move towards 
social populism, see Ivaldi, 2015). RPR parties developed agendas oriented towards 
nativist welfare statism that were perceived to be popular among voters and that included 
elements of labour market protection. The support for RPR parties among workers who 
feel precarious reflects a ‘new winning formula’ by RPR parties, which are moving to the 
left on socio-economic issues, given that their supporters are no longer the ‘petit bour-
geoisie’ but voters with lower socio-economic status (Harteveld, 2016). A similar trend 
towards the left on labour market issues emerges among the less explored parties of the 
radical left. The recent rising relevance of RL parties has been directly linked to the sup-
port they are getting due to post-austerity fatigue (March and Rommerskirchen, 2012). 
Ideologically, RL parties have been defined as ‘radical’ for their rejection of the contem-
porary structure of capitalism, in particular their desire to change its power structures 
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vis-à-vis the existing political and economic elites (Azmanova, 2011; Bale and Dunphy, 
2011; March, 2011). Regarding the symbolic/indirect process, the ‘pull-in’ to the two 
radical options, RPR and RL, suggests that, in the presence of heightened insecurity, vot-
ers move towards anti-establishment options (Gidron and Hall, 2017).
Labour market insecurity, the centre block and radical 
parties in France and the Netherlands
Our analysis focuses on the Netherlands and France, two ideal case studies for exploring 
the decline in support for established parties and the surge in support for radical parties. 
These countries have distinct political and institutional environments (a semi-presiden-
tial system in France and a unitary constitutional monarchy in the Netherlands), as well 
as different electoral systems. At the same time, we consider these two countries ‘ideal’ 
cases because they display three trends in their respective 2017 elections that are para-
digmatic of the pull-out/pull-in dynamics occurring in Europe, as described in the previ-
ous section. In terms of case-study selection, this allows us to select two cases interested 
by a similar pattern, but with two distinct political systems.
First, for both countries the results of the 2017 elections evidenced the ongoing decline 
of the centre. Support for the centre-right (UMP/LR in France and CDA in the Netherlands) 
and the centre-left (PS in France and PvdA in the Netherlands) has dramatically declined 
during the past decade in both countries (Krouwel, 2012) (please see Table 2 below for the 
full party names). As noted by Kalyvas and van Kersbergen (2010), Christian democratic 
and social democratic parties have weakened labour market protection and promoted 
active labour market policies post-2008 (while the basis of social democracy had remained 
stable even during the 1980s, see van Kersbergen, 1995). These medium-term trends have 
been consolidated with the results of the 2017 elections. PvdA went from support of 
24.7% (2012) to 5.7% (2017), which constituted its largest loss since WWII. Similarly, 
the French Socialist Party suffered a fall in support from 29.4% (2012) to 7.4% (2017).
Second, in both countries the 2017 elections evidenced the popularity of self-pro-
claimed anti-establishment/populist parties. The Dutch case study consists of a PR sys-
tem without a threshold that allows voters to express support for radical party alternatives. 
Both the radical left (the Dutch Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP)) and the radical 
right (the Dutch anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV)) are 
traditionally well represented in parliament, with PVV reaching 13% support in the latest 
elections in 2017; furthermore, new radical parties have gained support recently (Kutiyski 
et al., 2021). In the French 2017 elections, the Front National (now Rassemblement 
national) kept its prominent 13% share of the votes, with support for the radical left party 
La France Insoumise, which obtained an 11% share, increasing.
Third, in the 2017 elections, labour market protection featured heavily in the agendas 
of such radical parties and their electoral positioning. An analysis of the French legisla-
tive election in 2017 (Krouwel et al., 2019: 21–22) shows that La France Insoumise and 
the radical left Dutch SP were positioned on the left on labour market protection com-
pared to established parties, but also that the Front National and PVV presented ele-
ments of welfare chauvinism that placed them (in part) on the left side of the left–right 
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quadrant on socio-economic issues. While the 2012–2017 French socialist government 
promoted labour market reforms oriented towards deregulation (Milner, 2017), the 
2017 elections saw a polarisation between En Marche’s pro-labour market reformism 
position and the radical camps of La France Insoumise and the Front National, which 
offered alternatives to Macron’s pro-liberalisation of the labour market (see also Vitiello 
et al., 2017). As shown by Michel (2017), between 2007 and 2012 the Front National 
(FN) substantially accelerated its programmatic shifts towards a leftist labour market 
agenda (e.g. an increase in the minimum wage), which spoke to the ‘lower-earning 
French citizens’ in a welfare chauvinist fashion. Similarly, the Dutch Labour (PvdA) 
proposals to address labour market insecurity were not well received and focused only 
on more extreme precarious workers (Krouwel et al., 2019). Voters supporting SP (RL) 
and PVV (RPR) in the Netherlands shared an opposition to neoliberal policies and were 
pro-redistribution (ibid.).
Suggesting a similar trend, ‘the PS [in France] and PvdA [in the Netherlands] lost vot-
ers to much more progressive parties (La France Insoumise and GroenLinks respec-
tively)’ (Krouwel et al., 2019: 21, 22). To sum up, the 2017 elections in France and the 
Netherlands represent a snapshot of three relevant trends in European electoral politics, 
namely the decline of centrist parties after a decade of active labour market policies, the 
surge of anti-establishment parties reaching a peak point and the active use of labour 
market protection by such parties.
Measuring precarity and hypotheses
Measuring precarity
In line with our framework above, we have identified a list of indicators to explore pre-
carity. Measures of subjective insecurity in relation to voting are surprisingly lacking in 
political sciences (Marx and Picot, 2020: 357), despite their use in sociology and psy-
chology. Our study fills this gap, as we included a variety of subjective insecurity meas-
ures to capture precarity in a multidimensional way.
Item 1 is an operationalisation of Standing’s (2011: 11) employment security, which 
measures ‘protection against arbitrary dismissal’ as subjectively experienced by the 
respondent. Item 2 is a scale version of the first question of the Employment Precarity 
Index (PEPSO, 2015) and allows paid leave to be captured as a measure of work security. 
Item 3 is an operationalisation of autonomy at work that is linked to quality of work 
(Gallie et al., 2017). Item 4 is the classic ‘cognitive employment insecurity’ (see 
Kalleberg, 2014). Item 5 is an operationalisation of the fear of the worker vis-à-vis 
employers/managers, measured as a proxy of control and job tenure insecurity (Standing, 
2011: 32). Item 6 is the classic way of operationalising labour market insecurity in the 
literature (Green, 2009), as job tenure insecurity. Item 7 represents a measure of satisfac-
tion in opportunities of job advancement that is part of the job quality literature (Kalleberg, 
2014). This item is a proxy of job security for Standing (2011: 10) because it captures the 
opportunities of career progress that influence workers’ current satisfaction at work. Item 
8 is an indicator of work–life balance that features in Standing’s (2011: 82) discussion of 
precarity, as well as being key to operationalisations of job quality (Erhel et al., 2012; 
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Leschke and Watt, 2014). Finally, item 9 captures the perceived level of wages, which 
features in both the precarity (Standing, 2011: 10) and the job quality literature. 
Altogether, these nine indicators capture some of the salient dimensions of precarity 
illustrated above (Standing, 2011): employment insecurity (item 1), work security (item 
2), autonomy at work (item 3), cognitive employment insecurity (item 4), job tenure 
insecurity (items 5–6), job security through upwards mobility (item 7), work–life bal-
ance (item 8) and income insecurity (item 9).
Identifying the two dimensions
As there are no established indicators to measure precarity, we use exploratory factor 
analysis in a generative way (Haig, 2005) to rigorously explore latent theoretical con-
structs from a set of observables. From our variables, we obtained a matrix of tetrachoric 
correlations on which we ran a principal component factor analysis. In keeping with 
current practice, we selected the factors with an eigenvalue higher than one. As shown in 
Table A1 in the appendix, two main factors emerged, denoting the two distinct dimen-
sions of precarity: factor 1 (which we call ‘precarity at work’) and factor 2 (which we call 
‘precarity of tenure’) (see Table 1 for the full list of items in the two dimensions).
We label factor 2 precarity of tenure because the items (1, 5 and 6) used to form this 
dimension are measures of subjective insecurity or precarity regarding the tenure of 
work. The remaining items (2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9) refer to the subjective insecurity in work-
ing conditions (work security, autonomy at work, cognitive employment insecurity, job 
security as upwards mobility, work–life balance and income insecurity), and therefore 
we call this second dimension ‘precarity at work’. Our labelling mirrors in part Gallie 
et al.’s (2017) distinction between subjective insecurity in job tenure and subjective inse-
curity in job status/work conditions (although their items refer to future threats and ours 
to present conditions).
Table 1. Items for each dimension of precarity.
Precarity of tenure Precarity at worka
1.  ‘I fear I might be dismissed in the near 
future’
2.  ‘I fear I am not working enough according 
to my managers’
3.  ‘My total hours of paid employment are 
likely to decrease in the next six months’
4.  ‘I usually get paid if I miss a day of 
work’
5.  ‘I am autonomous in my work 
decisions’
6.  ‘It would be easy for me to find a 
job with another employer with 
approximately the same income and 
benefits I now have’
7.  ‘I have satisfactory opportunities for 
career advancement’
8.  ‘My work–life balance is satisfactory’
9.  ‘My salary is appropriate for my 
responsibilities’
aNote that precarity at work considers the disagreement with these items, while precarity of tenure the 
agreement.
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Our hypotheses
We test two hypotheses regarding the relationship between precarity and voting.
Hypothesis 1: People who feel more precarious (in terms of precarity of tenure and/or 
precarity at work) are less likely to vote for established centrist parties of Christian 
democratic and social democratic origin.
This hypothesis reflects the changing position on socio-economic issues of both the 
social democrats, who have moved from a rhetoric of labour market protection and 
labour rights to one of flexicurity and choice (see Bale et al., 2010), and the centre-right, 
which has progressively abandoned socialist capitalism (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 
2010). More broadly, our hypothesis reflects the fundamental shift within US and 
Western European politics, as predicted by Kirchheimer (1966). According to 
Kirchheimer, the main ideological divisions between the political left and right were 
rapidly disappearing, and all major parties (social democrats and Christian democrats) 
were transforming into ideologically bland, centrist ‘catch-all’ parties, appealing to the 
same broad swathe of middle-class working voters and increasingly detached from the 
interests they came into politics to represent (see Allern and Bale, 2012; Ignazi, 2017; 
Krouwel, 2012).
Hypothesis 2: People who feel more precarious (in terms of precarity of tenure and/or 
precarity at work) are more likely to vote for radical parties (parties of the radical left 
and radical populist right).
This hypothesis reflects our previously discussed ‘winning agendas’ formulated by 
RPR and RL parties that put the labour market at the centre. Following the shift by RPR 
parties towards workers’ rights and progressive policies (Michel, 2017), voters would 
move towards RPR parties, as they perceive that migration/closing borders is a potential 
solution to their labour market and personal insecurity (Hillje, 2018). Reflecting the 
enhanced interest in workers’ rights of the radical left post-austerity (March and 
Rommerskirchen, 2012), precarious voters would opt for RL parties when they believe 
that their precarity can be remedied/solved with redistribution. This also reflects a more 
symbolic shift away from ‘established parties’ that tend to alienate voters with higher 
levels of subjective insecurity (see section 2).
Given the overall trend of a decline in job quality in Europe, and in some respects in 
job tenure security (Gallie, 2017), we hypothesise that subjective labour market insecu-
rity works in the same way in both countries. We suspect that the effect will be greater in 
France, as France has experienced the biggest job quality drop between 2005 and 2010 
and shows a comparatively high level of tenure insecurity (Erhel et al., 2012; Leschke 
and Watt, 2014). The Netherlands features among the countries with less job quality loss 
in Europe, but we assume the effect of precarity to be present there too, given the reported 
issues in work–life balance (Leschke and Watt, 2014: 21). The Netherlands also shows a 
comparatively high level of tenure insecurity (Erhel et al., 2012), though this tends to be 
voluntary and so less likely to affect insecurity (Leschke and Watt, 2014).
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Methodology
Recruitment
To collect data on voting behaviour along with assessments of respondents’ economic 
situation, we used email panels obtained via Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) (for a 
detailed description of the methodology used for the development of VAAs, see Krouwel 
and van Elfrinkhof, 2014). VAAs are essentially information tools that prospective vot-
ers can use to compare their own policy preferences with the official policy positions of 
political parties. A subset of respondents voluntarily provided their email addresses so 
that they could be contacted for future research.
To date, there is no comparative secondary dataset available to investigate multidi-
mensional precarity (see above) or to test both precarity of tenure and precarity at work 
as determinants of voting choice. To collect original data, we used opt-in Internet panel 
surveys that recruited respondents via online VAAs. VAAs provide information for pro-
spective voters that helps them to learn about the policy proposals of political parties 
during an election campaign. They generate vast amounts of data about the political 
preferences of their users. An emerging literature uses VAA-generated data to learn about 
representation and political behaviour (Garzia and Marschall, 2012; van der Linden and 
Vowles, 2017). The data collection was conducted before and/or during the legislative 
elections held in the two countries (February 2017 in the Netherlands for the May elec-
tions, and May 2017 in France for the June elections) and collected 31,800 observations 
in the Netherlands and 6,992 in France.
Selection
We used subsets of VAA respondents from France and the Netherlands who volunteered 
for future research to implement a comparative study of precarity. Like most online pan-
els, VAA panels are non-probability samples. VAA-generated data are subject to a two-
fold self-selection bias (Pianzola, 2014) where users first opt into VAA usage (often 
younger and more educated citizens) and then opt into follow-up studies. Figure 1 dis-
plays the key demographics in terms of age, gender and education, and shows that our 
country samples deviate from the 2011 census figures. Crucially, our samples resemble 
the demographic make-up of likely voters more than that of the general population, in 
that participants in our surveys are older, more educated and more likely male.
Weighting
In our analysis, we are looking at the specific vote choice in relation to precarity, thus 
non-voters will need to be discarded eventually. Nevertheless, we computed post-strati-
fication weights so that the joint distribution of gender, age and education is matched 
exactly to what would be expected if the three samples mirrored the proportions in the 
census (fixed at the red dashed line in Figure 1).
To further evaluate our sample on an independent (i.e., non-demographic) measure, 
we show weighted and unweighted estimates of six key party vote shares in Figure 2 
(below). The results show that our estimates were already within 5 to 10 percentage 
Antonucci et al. 11
points in the unweighted figures and therefore came close to the official election results. 
Weighting improved the precision of all the figures in the Netherlands. Based on these 
figures, we take away two key points: that adjustment ‘back’ to the general population, 
rather than ‘likely voter’ demographics, slightly, but not substantially, decreased the 
accuracy of the vote share estimates except for in the Netherlands, and that, in general, 
we have a relatively accurate estimate of niche party support, whereas we may underes-
timate major party support. Our finding here is in line with a general consensus about 
VAA-generated data, which is that it is superior in studying the sources of fringe and 
radical party support (e.g. Hooghe and Teepe, 2007; Wall et al., 2009), an area where 
traditional surveys are likely to suffer from low statistical power due to smaller sample 
sizes.
Operationalisation and instruments
Respondents were asked a number of questions related to their current employment. The 
questions were framed in terms of agreement with a statement, such as ‘I fear I might be 
dismissed in the near future’, to be expressed on a scale of 1 to 4. In order to consider the 
variation in the respondents’ use of scales, for each question we merged answers denot-
ing full (answer 4) and fair (answer 3) agreement on the one hand, and full (1) and fair 
(2) disagreement on the other, thus obtaining a set of dichotomous variables that indi-
cated broad agreement or not with each statement.
Figure 1. Sample imbalance and the census.
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Figure 2. Weighting.




Radical left (RL) parties Established 
parties
France Front National (FN) La France Insoumise (FI); Europe 
Écologie Les Verts (EELV); Front 
de gauche (FG); Parti communiste 
français (PCF); Parti communiste 
réunionnais (PCR);
Parti de gauche (PG); Parti radical de 
gauche (PGR); Lutte Ouvrière (LO)
Les Républicains 




Partij voor de 
Vrijheid (PVV); 
Pim Fortuyn List 
(PFL); Forum voor 
Democratie (FvD)
Socialistische Partij (SP); Partij voor 




Partij van de 
Arbeid (PvdA)
We selected radical right and left parties using a party family approach, which under-
stands parties as grouped by ideological affinity (Mair and Mudde, 1998) – see Table 2 
below. In line with earlier studies on party families, we used the categorisation from a 
longitudinal analysis of party change (Krouwel, 2012), which includes extensive descrip-
tions of party histories and ideological affiliation.
In Table 3, we report some descriptive statistics on the two indexes of precarity. As 
discussed above, precarity at work exhibits higher standardised scores in all countries 
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than precarity of tenure, with the largest differences in France and the lowest in the 
Netherlands. Women exhibit slightly higher precarity at work than men on average, 
whereas precarity of tenure seems to affect both genders equally. Finally, age seems to be 
only very weakly correlated with precarity in general, except for older respondents (over 
66 years), who report lower levels of precarity. The two indexes were normalised to take 
on values between 0 and 1 and were used as explanatory variables in a series of logistic 
regressions of the probability of voting for mainstream or radical parties. In each regres-
sion, we included a set of control variables related to demographic characteristics (gen-
der, age and education) (see A2), so that our results are not dependent on those 
demographic differences.
Results: the association between precarity and voting in 
France and the Netherlands
Below, we test our three hypotheses, calculating odds ratios, as these indicate the likeli-
hood that voters who feel precarious will vote for either established or radical parties. A 
score of 1 means that the odds of voting for either are equal; a score above 1 means a 
higher chance of voting for the party considered in each estimation; and a score below 1 
indicates a lower chance (see Table 4).
The first hypothesis posited that voting for established parties – social democrats and 
Christian democrats – is negatively associated with precarity of tenure and/or precarity 
Table 3. Vote determinants for established and radical parties (odds ratio).
Established  
parties
Radical (RPR + RL) 
parties
 NL (CDA; PvdA) FR (LR; PS) NL FR
Age 1.035*** 1.024*** 1.014*** 0.990***
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Woman 0.687*** 0.975 0.969 1.107
 [0.068] [0.106] [0.144] [0.114]
Secondary education 0.698*** 1.393** 1.701*** 0.791**
 [0.0736] [0.187] [0.208] [0.086]
Tertiary education 0.617** 1.556*** 2.548*** 0.698***
 [0.127] [0.172] [0.506] [0.0617]
Precarity at work 0.415*** 0.784 2.838*** 3.901***
 [0.112] [0.154] [1.051] [0.760]
Precarity of tenure 0.732 0.437*** 1.723 3.132***
 [0.258] [0.118] [0.750] [0.855]
Constant 0.291*** 0.206*** 0.110*** 0.183***
 [0.040] [0.037] [0.023] [0.028]
Observations 31,800 6,992 31,800 6,992
RPR: Radical populist right; RL: Radical left; CDA: Christen-Democratisch Appèl; LR: Les Républicains; PS: 
Parti socialiste; NL = The Netherlands; FR: France.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
14 Sociological Research Online 00(0)
Table 4. Vote determinants for radical populist right (RPR) and radical left (RL) parties  
(odds ratios).
Radical Populist Right Radical Left
 NL (PVV; PFL; FvD) FR (FN) NL (SP; PvD) FR (FI & 
other parties)
Age 1.015*** 1.005 1.010*** 0.984***
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003]
Woman 0.621** 0.953 1.365* 1.160
 [0.145] [0.168] [0.244] [0.131]
Secondary education 2.483*** 0.421*** 1.178 1.257*
 [0.427] [0.069] [0.180] [0.158]
Tertiary education 2.490*** 0.152*** 2.167*** 1.417***
 [0.481] [0.023] [0.571] [0.146]
Precarity at work 2.283 3.687*** 2.575** 2.638***
 [1.147] [1.105] [1.135] [0.563]
Precarity of tenure 2.257 7.556*** 1.228 0.977
 [1.491] [2.866] [0.555] [0.270]
Constant 0.042*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.110***
 [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.020]
Observations 31,800 6,992 31,800 6,992
PVV: Partij voor de Vrijheid; FN: Front National; SP: Socialistische Partij; FI: La France Insoumise; NL: The 
Netherlands; PFL: The Pim Fortuyn List; FR: France.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
at work in the two countries, which is confirmed in France and in the Netherlands. This 
expected effect of precarity on established party voting is specifically evidenced in that 
precarity at work significantly reduces the odds of voting for established parties in the 
Netherlands, while in France it is the precarity of tenure appears to be the significant 
factor in reducing the odds of voting for established parties (see Table 3). Both precarity 
of tenure and precarity at work are associated with voting for the political extremes in 
France and the Netherlands, evidencing that perceived precarity at least partly explains 
why people are less likely to vote for established parties in these countries.
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the same results for the two countries. The 
estimated marginal impact of precarity at work on the probability of voting for estab-
lished parties in the Netherlands ranges between -5 and -10 percentage points, with the 
confidence interval consistently below zero (which would denote no marginal impact). 
Broadly the same range of values is found for the marginal impact of precarity of tenure 
on the probability of voting for established parties in France. The results confirm that 
subjective insecurity, in general, pulls voters away from establishment parties (see also 
Gidron and Hall, 2017). In France, precarity of tenure is significant in this process, pos-
sibly as a result of the contextual rise in temporary employment reported in the literature 
(Erhel et al., 2012; Leschke and Watt, 2014). In the Netherlands, the significant associa-
tion is with precarity at work, possibly as an effect of the decline in work–life balance in 
the country (Leschke and Watt, 2014: 21). Additional variables to account for the mediat-
ing role of institutional differences could clarify this puzzle.
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Our second hypothesis delved deeper, assuming that precarity of tenure and/or precar-
ity at work is positively associated with voting for both the radical populist right (RPR) 
and the radical left (RL) in France and the Netherlands.
Table 3 clearly shows that these precarity effects occur, although the ‘precarity effect’ 
varies across the two countries and depends on the specific dimension of precarity (ten-
ure or precarity at work) and the type of radical support (radical right or radical left). 
Precarity at work seems to have similar effects on the odds of voting for either the radical 
right or the radical left: in both countries, the odds increase by a factor of 2 to 3.
Precarity of tenure, however, seems to increase the odds of voting for the radical right 
in particular. This effect is particularly pronounced in France, where precarity of tenure 
(or fear of job loss) increases the odds of voting for the radical right by a factor of 7.5. The 
findings are revealing of a relationship between precarity and voting for radical parties, in 
particular in France, where other parties aligned with flexible labour market agendas 
(Macron’s En Marche) appeared in the electoral system without attracting the votes of the 
Figure 3. Estimated marginal impact of precarity at work and precarity of tenure on the 
probability of voting for established parties in the Netherlands and France.
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precarious (voting for En Marche is negatively associated with both forms of precarity – 
see Table A4 in the appendix). The figures below give a graphic representation of the 
same results for radical right voters (Figure 4) and radical left voters (Figure 5) in the 
Netherlands and in France so that the reader can appreciate the intensity of the precarity 
effect.
The results also confirm that subjective insecurity, in general, pulls voters towards 
radical parties (see section 2; Gidron and Hall, 2017). The significant associations 
between forms of precarity and support for party types (RPR and RL) are also telling. 
Precarity of tenure remains significant in France, while precarity at work is significant in 
the Netherlands and in France, possibly because the ‘job quality’ criticalities identified 
in the two countries (Erhel et al., 2012; Leschke and Watt, 2014) reverberate through the 
political sphere. With the exception of the association between RPR support and precar-
ity of tenure in France, the significant associations between different forms of precarity 
and RPR/RL voting relate to ‘precarity at work’. This might reflect how the main ‘issue’ 
Figure 4. Estimated marginal impact of precarity at work and precarity of tenure on the 
probability of voting for radical populist right parties in the Netherlands and France.
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Figure 5. Estimated marginal impact of precarity at work and precarity of tenure on the 
probability of voting for radical left parties in the Netherlands and France.
in the current European labour market is the precarity of work conditions, with tempo-
rary contracts affecting a minority of workers (Gallie, 2017). However, this needs to be 
confirmed in studies that examine other countries.
Discussion and conclusion
The recent surge in support for radical populist right parties is often ascribed to ‘precarity’ 
(Gidron and Hall, 2017; Tammes, 2017), but subjective measures of labour market insecu-
rity are surprisingly lacking in the literature (Marx and Picot, 2020). In this article, we 
combine the sociological research on precarity and its applications (Parfitt and Barnes, 
2020; Standing, 2011) with the analysis of voting behaviours to explain voting patterns for 
radical right and left parties among working voters in the Netherlands and France.
Our study makes a number of significant contributions to the literature. First, we 
introduce and test a multidimensional operationalisation of precarity that builds on the 
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sociological literature (Standing, 2011) and operationalises precarity in relation to vot-
ing. This fills a gap in the exploration of the link between insecurity and voting, where 
subjective indicators of precarity are missing (Marx and Picot, 2020). As part of our 
exploratory work of operationalising precarity in relation to voting, we identify through 
EFA two dimensions – precarity of tenure and precarity at work – that have significant 
associations with voting. This work is significant for the literature because while most 
studies exploring labour market insecurity focus on objective measures of labour insecu-
rity (Emmenegger et al., 2015), the breadth of our items allows an examination of the 
elephant in the room in terms of understanding how European working voters experienc-
ing insecurity are attracted to populist (RPR and RL) voting options, namely subjective 
labour market insecurity in their tenure and working conditions. Whereas other scholars 
have tested the hypothesis that populism is driven by ‘left behind’ segments of the popu-
lation, and have turned it down in favour of cultural explanations (Norris and Inglehart, 
2019), our study on precarity of tenure and of work understands populism to be associ-
ated with the insecure conditions subjectively experienced by ordinary citizens 
(Antonucci et al., 2017; Gidron and Hall, 2017). An important limitation of our study is 
that we are only exploring precarity in relation to work, focussing therefore on working 
voters. Further research is necessary to test the role of other diffused forms of precarity, 
such as financial precarity.
The second significant contribution of the article is finding that precarity partially 
explains the support for radical parties in the 2017 elections in the Netherlands and France 
– two countries that ideally represent the increased support for both RPR and RL parties 
in the rest of Europe, while having two distinct political systems. In our case-study selec-
tion, therefore, precarity intervenes in explaining similar patterns of moving away from 
traditional politics that cannot be explained by the political system itself. In both coun-
tries, the narrative of established parties, including the social democrats, not being sup-
ported by voters experiencing precarity (not just working-class voters, as stated by 
Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015) holds. The associations between type of precarity (of 
tenure or at work) and support for either RPR or RL parties were also significant. In 
France, both precarity of tenure and precarity at work are positively associated with vot-
ing for the National Front, and precarity at work is positively associated with voting for 
La France Insoumise. This confirms the idea that the National Front is able to co-opt sup-
port from a segment of the population affected by precarity of work conditions and precar-
ity of tenure (Michel, 2017), while the radical left attracts support from voters with 
precarious work conditions (March and Rommerskirchen, 2012). In the Netherlands, we 
find that only precarity at work is negatively correlated with voting for mainstream parties 
and positively correlated with support for RPR and RL parties. We suspect that these 
cross-national differences might depend on the various ‘forms’ in which precarity features 
across the two countries: as insecurity in tenure and in work conditions in France, and 
mostly as insecurity in the work–life balance in the Netherlands (Leschke and Watt, 2014). 
This, of course, will need to be tested in future research that is also able to isolate the role 
of contextual and institutional factors in mediating the link between precarity and voting 
through multi-level analysis. Our online panel has allowed us to measure precarity in a 
multi-dimensional way, instead of relying on measures in large comparative surveys that 
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do not cover precarity or include only a few items. This does, however, mean that our data 
is limited to two cases with particular welfare and political/electoral systems. We specu-
late that our findings can be generalised across other contexts as well, but future research 
needs to investigate this.
Finally, our study originally positions the rise of populist right support within the 
broader framework of voters moving away from establishment party support and towards 
radical party support, whether that is for a left-wing or a right-wing party. The literature 
on radical (populist) right support has been plentiful in the last few years, with much less 
attention being given to radical left parties. We understand the moves towards the radical 
parties to be part of the alienation from the centre. It is significant that in our study there 
is evidence of associations between precarity and voting in countries that feature at the 
bottom (France) and the top (the Netherlands) of the job quality levels found in Europe 
(ibid.). We interpret this as a consequence of the political effects of the lowering quality 
of work that Europeans have experienced since the 2008 crisis (Gallie, 2017) and of the 
fact that both RPR and RL parties offer a response to subjective insecurity, indirectly 
(framing themselves as anti-establishment) and directly (via the ‘redistribution’ solution 
to labour market insecurity of RL parties and the chauvinist labour market protection for 
citizens proposed by RPR parties).
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Notes
1. The four areas of objective labour market disadvantage used in Emmenegger et al. (2015) are: 
unemployment, involuntary part-time work, temporary employment and low-wage work.
2. In this article, we use ‘radical populist right’ (RPR) to refer to parties that share a core ideol-
ogy that combines anti-immigrant nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2016).
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